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Summary 
This report assesses the measurement culture, an increasingly important feature of public 
services over the past twenty years. Such measurement has become especially important 
since the first Comprehensive Spending Review and the original publication of the Public 
Service Agreements (PSAs) in 1998. The Report concentrates in particular on performance 
targets, including the PSAs, and league tables. 
The Report recognises that every organisation needs to have a means for measuring its own 
performance internally and in comparison with others, if it is to learn, develop and 
motivate its staff. None of our witnesses seriously advocated that performance 
measurement should be swept away, and we recognise that much has been achieved by 
means of it. The increase in accountability and transparency which targets have brought 
with them has been valuable. Taxpayers and users of public services have a right to know 
how well their services are being delivered and who is accountable for them. We also 
acknowledge that where necessary the system has been adapted to changing circumstances.  
The Government’s five aspirations for its targets are that they should provide:  
• a clear statement of what the Government is trying to achieve;  
• a clear sense of direction and ambition;  
• a focus on delivering results;  
• a basis for what is and is not working; and 
• better accountability. 
What we found, however, is that these very laudable aims are in many cases not being 
fulfilled nor widely recognised as such by those on the front line whose job it is to deliver 
them. This is not least because of the lack of proper integration between the building of an 
organisation’s capacity through what we call ‘the performance culture’ and tracking 
quantitative achievement in the public services through the ‘measurement culture’. The 
result has been tension between those charged with centralised responsibility and those 
who are responsible for dispersed delivery of public services. 
We therefore make a number of recommendations which propose that the Government 
comes forward with a White Paper on targets in good time for the Spending Review 2004. 
This would better integrate the performance and measurement cultures by: 
• ensuring greater local autonomy to construct more meaningful and relevant targets, 
and making sure they are as few as possible, and focus on key outcomes; 
• widening the targets consultation process to involve professionals, service users and, as 
part of the Spending Review process, select committees and Parliament; and 
• reforming the way in which targets are set, to move away from a simplistic hit or miss 
approach towards measures of progress which will enable better and more intelligent 
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comparisons by managers and users alike. 
We believe all this should be underpinned by:  
• common reporting standards on PSA targets;  
• independent assessment by the National Audit Office (NAO) of whether and how far 
targets have been met; 
• annual reporting on performance by Government on the model of the Scottish 
Executive with the information independently validated by the NAO, National 
Statistics and the Audit Commission as appropriate; and  
• an action plan to enhance performance management skills locally and at the centre. 
Inevitably such reforms have implications for greater, decentralised, political accountability 
which will need to be faced up to if the ‘new localism’, recently proclaimed by the 
Government, is to become a reality. We also call for a more mature political debate about 
the measurement culture, based on a better understanding of targets as tools to improve 
performance. 
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1 Introduction 
1. This report examines the current policy of government by measurement. Our inquiry 
has concentrated in particular on the performance targets now set for public services. We 
have tried to assess how well targets meet the Government’s objectives, and have 
considered some proposals for reform.  
Our approach 
2. We start from a number of basic assumptions: 
• That the public wants and expects sustained improvements in the delivery of public 
services, which is also a Government priority; 
• That service providers in receipt of public funds ought to be publicly accountable for 
their performance; and 
• That setting targets can be one means of stimulating better performance by those who 
deliver services. 
3. We recognise that there is much more to the operation of public services than targets. 
But they have become a talisman in the debate on public service reform, and we are keen to 
ensure that they support and do not hinder that reform. 
4. The Government has a number of different approaches to gauging service performance. 
As an aid to clarity, we set out in Box A definitions of the most common features of the 
measurement culture. 
BOX A 
The Language of the Measurement Culture—A Glossary 
• Inputs: the resources used by an organisation. 
• Outputs: the services, goods or products provided by the organisation with the inputs.  
• Outcomes: the benefits or value generated by the organisation’s activities. 
• Performance indicators (PIs): quantifiable measures used to monitor performance and 
report on it to the public. 
• Management information, which usually includes both numerical and non-numerical 
ways of monitoring and understanding performance. 
• Performance management, which is used in a wide variety of ways and usually at least 
includes: 
• identifying objectives; 
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• allocating them to individuals or teams; and 
• monitoring progress. 
• Targets: usually desired or promised levels of performance based on performance 
indicators. They may specify a minimum level of performance, or define aspirations for 
improvement. 
• League tables: intended to enable comparisons of performance between different 
service providers to be made. 
• Public Service Agreements: (PSAs), first introduced in the 1998 Comprehensive 
Spending Review as an integral part of the Government’s spending plans. Each major 
department has a PSA, setting out the department’s objectives and the targets for 
achieving these. 
• Service Delivery Agreements: (SDAs), introduced in the 2000 Spending Review, set out 
lower level output targets and milestones underpinning delivery of the PSA. 
• Standards: may be used for a variety of purposes, including indicating to the public the 
minimum standard of service they can expect from a public body, or to a service 
provider the standard which should be achieved (and against which they may be 
assessed for compliance). Targets can be based upon standards—for example to achieve 
a minimum standard consistently, or to improve over time so that the standard is 
achieved. 
• Benchmark: normally involves a detailed analysis of comparative performance to help 
identify what underlies differences between two similar bodies.1  
 
5. This report examines the role of targets across the public services, but much of our 
evidence relates to targets set in health, education, local government and the police and 
criminal justice system. We refer often to the system of public service agreements (PSAs), 
concluded between the Treasury and other departments, and their influence at all levels of 
public service. (This Report covers some of the same ground as a 1999 Treasury Select 
Committee report on PSAs).2 We touch on performance league tables, another prominent 
feature of the measurement culture. We also identify an increasingly important role for 
benchmarking in the improvement of services.  
Our inquiry and this report  
6. This has been a comprehensive inquiry. We had 11 evidence sessions with 39 witnesses, 
and received 63 memoranda. We also took evidence on two visits, one to Bristol on 9 and 
10 December 2002 and one to Canada (Ottawa, Montreal and Toronto) from 8 to 13 June 
2003. We are grateful to all those who have given evidence.  
 
1 based partly on Audit Commission submission PST 31A 
2 Seventh Report 1998–99 HC 378 
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7. We are particularly grateful to our specialist advisers: Professor Richard Rose of the 
University of Strathclyde, Professor Colin Talbot of the University of Nottingham, Tony 
Travers, Director of the Greater London Group, London School of Economics and Sir 
Nicholas Monck, formerly Permanent Secretary at the Department of Employment. They 
have made a major contribution to the inquiry, as has Pauline Ngan, who prepared the 
annex on the Government’s achievements against targets. 
8. The first part of this Report largely describes the measurement culture as seen from 
Whitehall and Westminster. We outline, first, the Government’s aspirations for targets and 
league tables. The second part of the report examines the landscape from closer to the 
‘front line’ where most services are delivered.  
The two cultures of public service reform 
9. There seem to be two cultures at work in the Government’s approach to public service 
reform. The first approach emphasises capacity-building in organisations, with attention to 
leadership and management issues. As such, the focus is on the organic ingredients of 
durable change and improvement. This is a central task for the  Prime Minister’s Office of 
Public Services Reform, which has responsibility for “working with departments to embed 
reform and identify best practice”. The second approach is typified by targets, its time 
frame is shorter and its techniques are more mechanistic. Among other things, the Prime 
Minister’s Delivery Unit “assesses and supports delivery in each of the departments, in 
particular, ensuring that there is a Delivery Plan in use for each target”. Both have their 
place, but it is important that the former is not crowded out by the latter. Durable capacity-
building is the key to public service improvement. This means good leadership and 
effective management. With this in place, target-setting and other performance measures 
will form a natural part of an organisation’s business planning. This requires a whole-
system approach to change and improvement, engaging the knowledge and commitment 
of all those who work in an organisation. 
The Government’s five aspirations for the measurement culture 
10. In seeking to assess the measurement culture, we believe it is useful first to set out what 
the Government is trying to achieve with targets and tables, and to examine what benefits 
they might bring. We take as our main text a recent Government statement on the issue, a 
joint memorandum to this Committee from the Treasury and the Delivery Unit of the 
Cabinet Office.3 In the context of a discussion of PSAs, this asks the question “Why set 
targets?” and answers by setting out the key aspirations. We now examine each of these 
statements of Government aspirations in turn, using evidence given to our inquiry to 
explore their implications.  
 
 
3 PST 60 
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“Targets provide a clear statement of what the Government is trying to achieve. They 
set out the Government’s aims and priorities for improving public services and the 
specific results Government is aiming to deliver. Targets can also be used to set 
standards to achieve greater equity”.4 
 
11. In 1998 the Government set out its model of an effective target, one that would: “form 
the heart of the PSA. They are, wherever possible, ‘SMART’—specific, measurable, 
achievable, relevant and timed”.5 In the view of the Government, such targets can help 
ministers and others give a lead, providing a clear signal to those who deliver services. The 
former Permanent Secretary at DfEE, Sir Michael Bichard, gave us a vivid description of 
the logic of targets as seen from Whitehall: 
“The point about targets… is that you are never going to have enough money. I used 
to say to my staff ‘It is very unlikely I will ever get up in front of you and you say ‘Fair 
cop, guv, we have got far too much money we do not know what to do with it’ It is 
always going to be ‘We have not got enough money’. You have to use that resource 
as well as you possibly can… targets are a way of making sure that people will focus 
their energy on the things which you think generally are the priorities otherwise 
everyone has got their own view about what they should be doing”.6  
12. This describes well how central government can use targets to communicate priorities 
and give direction in a way that makes the most of the commitment and dedication of 
public servants. The word ‘focus’ was used repeatedly in evidence to us on the role of 
targets. This also involves something else; the fact that among the Government’s most 
important arguments for targets is the need to ensure equity in the provision of public 
services. Targets are one sign of the Government’s belief there is a set of common 
standards and entitlements which must be met, a form of guarantee that there is fairness in 
the provision of publicly funded services, wherever they are provided and whoever is 
receiving them. 
“Targets provide a clear sense of direction and ambition. The aim, objectives and 
targets in each PSA provide a clear statement around which departments can mobilize 
their resources. This helps in business planning and communicating a clear message to 
staff and to the various public bodies which contribute to delivering each department’s 
programme”.7 
 
13. This expresses the importance of planning, motivation and communication in public 
services. We heard much evidence about the effect of targets on motivation, for good or ill. 
There is no doubt that targeting can at times lead to a clarity about aims which inspires real 
commitment. The Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police, Mr Peter Neyroud, told us 
 
4 PST 60 
5 ‘Public Services for the Future: Modernisation, Reform, Accountability’ Cm 4181, 1998 
6 Q 126 
7 Op.cit. 
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how the targets attached to the campaign to cut street crime helped to make his force work 
effectively towards their goal: 
“From a Thames Valley perspective, we had a high level of robbery and rising, which 
clearly needed sorting out. Actually energising folk into reducing robbery this year 
has completely energised the organisation over this last eight, nine months. There are 
examples where a target, which is something which people firmly believe is 
something they should be doing… can deliver much better results than you were 
expecting”.8  
14. This combination of a clear national focus with ‘something which people firmly 
believe… they should be doing’ appears to have achieved the central aim of improving the 
situation on the streets, while winning the support of those who police them.  
15. Targets require a starting point as well as a goal. Without knowing where things stand 
at present, there is no way of determining whether a target offers an organisation an easy 
goal, a challenge, or a target  as remote as the moon. In order to monitor progress, it is 
necessary to have a benchmark, agreed by all, showing how an organisation is performing 
here and now. When a number of schools or hospitals are benchmarked at the same time, 
the results can be compared. This helps in planning, and should enable service providers to 
be motivated to achieve their goals. 
“Targets provide a focus on delivering results. By starting from the outcome 
Government is trying to achieve, the targets encourage departments to think creatively 
about how their activities and policies contribute to delivering those results. They also 
encourage departments to look across boundaries to build partnerships with those they 
need to work with to be successful”.9 
 
16. Targeting shifts attention from the classic Treasury concerns of inputs (money and 
personnel) to outputs and outcomes. Outputs are goods and services delivered to 
individuals, households, businesses and communities, for example, patients having 
operations or students passing examinations. Outcomes are conditions in society, like the 
number of ex-prisoners getting jobs after release, patients being successfully treated, or 
children being able to read. Targets can be an important symbol of the need for change, 
helping to transform cultures; an example is the well-known target for putting 100% of 
government services online by 2005, which, it has been argued, helped to encourage a more 
active approach to the issue by departments.10 By concentrating on outcomes rather than 
process, agencies can be encouraged to work jointly to produce results. A cohesive 
approach was now the norm in the Prison Service, its then Director General, Martin Narey, 
told us:  
“I spend a lot of time now with colleagues in the departments of Health, Education, 
Work and Pensions, working together on targets and our targets on getting prisoners 
into jobs, for example, were constructed in consultation with Jobcentre Plus and 
 
8 Q 751 
9 Op.cit. 
10 PST 60 and PST 62 
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involve and depend on a heavy commitment from them to having job surgeries in 
prisons and so forth”.11  
“Targets provide a basis for monitoring what is and isn’t working. Being clear what you 
are aiming to achieve, and tracking progress, allows you to see if what you are doing is 
working. If it is, you can reward that success; if it isn’t, you can do something about 
it”.12 
 
17. Monitoring has two aspects. One is about keeping a check on the effectiveness, or 
otherwise, of performance. There may be a punitive element, with failing services at risk of 
closure or radical overhaul.  
18. But monitoring is also about something positive: the chance to identify and learn from 
success. For example, benchmarking with a group of similar bodies provides a sound basis 
for monitoring progress and seeing which service deliverers are working well. As Chief 
Education Officer in Birmingham, one of our witnesses, Professor Tim Brighouse, used 
comparisons between the performance of different schools as a way of driving up 
standards: 
“You are trying to energise but not simply energise from hoorah, hoorah, but… by 
helping them to see other people’s practice and when they see other people’s practice 
there is no stopping them. They then want to move forward”.13  
19. Tracking and monitoring of progress against targets are helpful to ensure 
improvements are being effective and to identify potential difficulties. One crucial point 
emerges from our evidence; there is an important distinction between performance 
information used internally, to support management and aid learning, and information 
put into the public domain to show how well services are performing. The quality of both 
needs to be high, but what is appropriate for one may not be appropriate for the other.  
20. The key role of leadership and intelligence in making the most of performance 
information is well illustrated by the case of the high-performing Staffordshire Ambulance 
Service, which has a list of 96 measures, monitored each day. What is important is that 
these are used internally as management information, and they appear to be understood as 
such. In this way, they are similar to management information in the private sector, used to 
track progress and inform discussion. The results of such internal sharing of information 
appear to have been impressive. But 96 public measures  would have been indigestible and 
impossible to interpret. 
21. We heard a great deal of evidence about the importance of making intelligent use of 
targets. Many of our witnesses said that information about performance against targets 
could help to provide useful pointers to the strengths and weaknesses of services. In order 
to ensure this, targets should be relevant and meaningful to those asked to deliver them. 
The Audit Commission told us: 
 
11 Q 728 
12 Op.cit. 
13 Q 367 
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“What makes a target ‘good’ is not just the way a target is expressed—it’s about the 
way it was derived, the extent to which service users were involved in its 
development, the extent to which it helps to achieve policy objectives, the extent to 
which it has the support of the staff whose efforts will achieve it, the quality of the 
data used to measure its achievement, and the clarity and transparency of its 
definition”.14  
22. From another perspective, Professor Alison Kitson of the Royal College of Nursing 
stressed the importance of dialogue on targets between the centre and local deliverers:  
“It is about ownership, it is about interpretation and understanding of the relevance 
and impact of the target to the people who are providing the business. It is that 
dialogue, that constant iteration between the people who are setting targets and the 
people who are having to deliver them that improves the quality of them”.15  
23. Comparing service providers offers an opportunity to promote better practices 
nationwide. Learning can take place through the encouragement of ‘horizontal’ dialogues 
between peers: for example head teachers, hospital managers, and police, which already 
occur in professional associations. By listening to horizontal discussions, policy-makers 
and target-setters can learn about what does and does not work on the ground. Familiarity 
with differences in context will avoid the naive assumption that a league leader’s practice 
can quickly be applied in all parts of the country and in widely different circumstances. 
“Targets provide better public accountability. Government is committed to regular 
public reporting of progress against targets. Targets are meant to be stretching. So not 
all targets can be hit. But everyone can see what progress is being made”.16 
 
24. Accountability comes in many forms. Good managers, in the public or private sector, 
can make effective internal use of performance information, including achievement against 
targets, to find out where problems are arising or successes are being achieved. This is to be 
warmly welcomed, because internally it provides a good basis for intelligent management 
of people. 
25. Reporting progress, or lack of it, is also an important element in public accountability. 
In recent years, governments have provided an increasing amount of information on 
public service performance, the latest example being access to data about PSAs via a single 
webpage.17 This is a positive development. Benchmarking the starting point provides a 
baseline for judging whether progress is being made. As we have indicated, we see this as 
central to good public services, and we had many examples of the increasing readiness of 
those involved in public service to make themselves accountable in this way. The Audit 
Commission told us: 
 
14 PST 31 
15 Q 753 
16 Op.cit. 
17 www.hm-treasury.gov.uk 
12    On Target? Government By Measurement 
 
“Many professionals nowadays recognise, and indeed welcome, public scrutiny of 
their role, as long as this is fair and objective. Using targets to open up the world of 
the ‘expert’ for public examination is an important part of accountability”.18  
26. The view from a former senior departmental official, Sir Michael Bichard, was robustly 
in favour of this approach:  
“I think they [league tables]do impose some peer pressure but they do enable also 
parents to ask questions… People who are running public services have got huge 
amounts of power and huge amounts of information. This is just a way of 
encouraging them to share some of that with the clients and I do not think that is 
unreasonable”.19 
27. In a previous report,20 this Committee has emphasised this need for a sharing of power, 
a professionalism which respects accountability, and an accountability which respects 
professionalism. This principle, we believe, should be central to the practice of government 
by measurement. In the next Chapter, we assess whether it is happening like that. 
 
 
18 PST 31 
19 Q 136 
20 ‘Making Government Work’ Seventh Report 2000–01 HC 94 
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Chapter 2: Problems of the measurement 
culture, and attempts to solve them 
28. We believe that the Government has laudable aspirations for its public service targets 
and performance tables. Yet, despite this, the Government’s policy was unpopular with 
many of our witnesses. Even where they agreed in principle with targets (which almost all 
said they did), they expressed serious reservations about their operation in practice. 
Allegations of cheating, perverse consequences and distortions in pursuit of targets, along 
with unfair pressure on professionals, continue to appear. League tables are often seen as 
untrustworthy and misleading.  
29. This Chapter looks at some of the evidence for this unpopularity, and tries to analyse 
the reasons. Below, we take each of the Government’s aspirations in turn, assessing to what 
extent they have failed to meet them. 
Five failings 
Lack of clarity about what the Government is trying to achieve; failure to 
produce equity 
30. Much of our evidence suggested that the measurement culture had failed to give a clear 
enough statement of the Government’s aims and priorities. While there was much 
exhortation and a wide range of targets, there was not a sufficiently coherent lead. 
31. The recent Cabinet Office review of Executive Agencies observed that “the link between 
Public Service Agreement targets and agency key targets is… often unclear”21 and “it is 
often difficult for agencies to see any real link between the services they deliver and the 
needs of the Department”.22 
32. The idea of relying on national targets to promote greater equity also raises a number of 
difficult issues. A national target can be met in more than one way, and some of them 
promote greater equity while others do not. For example, a 10% improvement in services 
can be achieved if all providers improve equally. Alternatively it can also be achieved if 
some units do disproportionately well while others fail. If top performers improve most, 
this will widen the gap between citizens in different parts of the country, while if poor 
performing agencies do best, this will not only raise the average but also reduce 
inequalities. It is important therefore to be clear about objectives. 
Failure to provide a clear sense of direction and ambition and to help plan 
resources. Failure to communicate a clear message to staff  
33. We doubt that the current target regime has succeeded in providing a clear sense of 
direction and ambition for our public services. Targets can never be substitutes for a 
 
21 Cabinet Office (2002), Better government services: Executive agencies in the 21st century; page 32. 
22 PST 54 
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proper and clearly expressed strategy and set of priorities, and we found that witnesses 
identified a significant risk that the target setting process had subverted this relationship, 
with targets becoming almost an end in themselves rather than providing an accurate 
measure of progress towards the organisation’s goals and objectives. Targets can be good 
servants, but they are poor masters. 
34. In his evidence to us Sir Michael Bichard recorded his concern that targets were 
“almost being presented as a substitute for business planning, that really all you needed was 
a small set of targets, they were in the PSA and you got your comprehensive spending 
money and then they were reviewed”.23 For him the key point was that targets should be 
“dropping out of the business plan” and not the other way round. Targets are no substitute 
for effective management. Peter Neyroud expressed a similar concern about the need to 
link target setting to strategic direction. He told us that “The linking of targets to a clear 
strategic direction and to resource allocation will ensure that a more limited number of 
well designed targets would be likely to have a far greater impact than a plethora of ill 
considered targets”.24  
35. Where centrally-imposed targets differ widely from what local people judge to be 
sensible aspirations, tensions can arise, making it difficult to keep a sense of ‘direction and 
ambition’. Jonathan Harris, formerly Director of Education for Cornwall, told us during 
our visit to Bristol of his disagreement with the DfES over targets for Key Stage 2. He had 
an admirably clear idea of what targets can do: “The purpose… of setting targets is to 
motivate the staff to perform better”.25 He suggested, like so many of our witnesses, that 
targets should be produced at least partly on the basis of local knowledge, “If you think, ‘I 
can just about make it’, you have a stretching target and I think services improve”. Instead 
of this, Cornwall was given what teachers, administrators and local politicians all felt was 
an unrealistic target, based upon national figures. Eventually, after tough negotiations, the 
two sides simply agreed to disagree. The outcome appeared to be counter-productive. As 
Mr Harris put it, “Something imposed from above nationally which has little relevance to a 
teacher in a school in the middle of Bodmin Moor is not necessarily stretching her and it 
may not actually achieve improvement”.26  
36. Many top-down targets were condemned by our witnesses. The Rt Hon Estelle Morris 
MP, former Secretary of State for Education, conceded to us that “The biggest problem at 
the moment is that the profession feels no ownership of the targets, none whatsoever”.27 
She added that “The key thing is the national target was set first, that was what caused the 
problem… but if the target was set at school level and then you built up you would not 
have the problem in making the jigsaw pieces fit the jigsaw”.28 Sir Michael Bichard said it 
was “absolutely hopeless to set a national target and then just tell local delivery units to go 
away and achieve those because they have got no idea what that national target means in 
terms of their performance, what they need to do to improve so that the national target is 
 
23 Q 72 
24 PST 30 
25 Q 516 
26 Q 515 
27 Q 965 
28 Q 967 
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achieved’.29 As Lord Browne observed “You cannot impose targets by fiat”.30 We strongly 
agree, and we also feel that, at the front line in the public services, there is still a perception 
that this is what is happening.  
37. The contrast with the commercial world is clear. The Audit Commission told us that 
“the private sector is comfortable with targets” because, while they are determined from the 
top, they are “built on measures which are valid from the ‘bottom-up’, for example sales, 
and generally accepted as valid”.31 The same could not be said for much of the public sector 
in the UK. 
38. The underlying problem seems to be that central departments often do not understand 
what life is like for those who deliver services. This was the view of James Strachan, 
Chairman of the Audit Commission, who identified one way in which physical and 
organisational geography can defeat attempts to learn from experience: 
“What concerns me is that there are two very severe skills shortages, one at the centre 
and one locally. At the centre there is still a real paucity at the senior level of people 
who are involved in the setting of targets, a lack of real world delivery experience and 
this is shown time and time again. And, secondly, related to that, is the fact that if 
you have a very controlling centre you have a tendency not only to set the ‘what’, but 
also to get far too much involved in the ‘how’. The second point is at a local level. At 
the local level often the experience of real world delivery is there, but what is not 
there is a real understanding of both the strengths but also the limitations of these 
tools and, of course, we see far too often that the mechanism which is purely a 
means, becomes an end in itself. It is not a learning tool, it is the actual object of all 
activity. That is very dangerous”.32  
39. Much of our evidence bears out Mr Strachan’s contention. Jan Filochowski, Chief 
Executive of Bath Royal United Hospital, criticised ministers for imagining that it was easy 
to replicate best practice all over the country:  
“I think maybe ministers sometimes feel that because one place does it right 
everyone can do it right, and it really is not as simple as that… When we started to be 
successful and people said, ‘Why don’t you give a seminar and tell people how to do 
it’? I said, ‘No, we have got to build up a whole battery of skills, it is a year long task, 
we have got to think about how you change the approach, it is a major, major task’. 
That is why it is not so transferable”.33  
40. Without allowing for a professional veto on change or accountability, there is a need to 
take proper account of the existence and expertise of professional groups. We had a great 
deal of evidence from medical colleges, headteachers’ associations and others concerned 
with professional standards, much of it expressing concern that targets failed to take 
account of their special expertise and judgement. Many (especially in the health service) 
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felt undermined by targets, with the late 1990s obsession with cutting waiting lists 
frequently cited as the most damaging example.34  
41. The Governor of Durham Prison and President of the Governors’ Association, Mike 
Newell, made clear the importance of getting the professionals involved when targets are 
set: 
“The key is the relationship between those professional managers and the target-
setting process… about making sure that the agenda of what needs to happen for 
performance improvement in an organisation is driven by professional involvement. 
If you have it at ministerial and senior civil service and our level end and you do not 
have a full connection with the professionals then you may end up measuring the 
wrong things and you may end up with very poor performing prisons, despite all the 
targets”.35  
42. Whilst the Treasury claims that it takes into account many views about measuring 
targets, all five groups it mentioned to us are at the top layer of government.36 Even senior 
representative organisations, like the Local Government Association, can sometimes feel 
neglected by government when it comes to setting targets: 
“We have not really had sufficient dialogue about the targets as such. We certainly 
did not the first time around. It has improved a bit in the last spending review”.37  
43. Evidence about service delivery must be collected in the first instance by the people 
doing the work. Under the Next Steps initiative so many agencies have become distanced 
from central government that Whitehall’s capacity to understand and control evidence of 
programme performance has weakened, ironically just as its anxiety to deliver has 
increased.  
44. Many of our witnesses said that there were too many targets from Whitehall. Mr John 
Grogono Thomas, a teacher at Novers Lane Primary School in Bristol, which we visited, 
said that “there have become too many targets. They become meaningless since managing 
them creates so much bureaucracy that they become distracting and cannot be effectively 
delivered. Also pupils cannot focus on them all”.38  
45. Another problem is the tendency for departments sometimes to appear to pluck targets 
out of the air in support of the latest initiative. Such targets will command neither respect 
nor credibility. A number of our witnesses cited the aim to reduce school truancies by 10% 
by 2004 compared to 2002 as a prime example of a target where the objective was seen as 
relevant and highly desirable but where the target figure was seen as quite arbitrary. 
46. Sir Jeremy Beecham of the Local Government Association thought the truancy target 
was “not meaningless in the sense that it is a figure which might be justified in practice but 
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one does not know how it has been derived”.39 Similarly David Hart, General Secretary of 
the National Association of Head Teachers (NAHT), could find no objective basis for a 
figure of 10%: “I think the reduction in truancy to 10% is not a bad target but again it is a 
target plucked out of the air. Why 10%? Why not 15% or 20% or 5%? …It is the percentage 
figures; it is the lack of proper consultation and discussion”.40 And in the end Estelle Morris 
found, “…it difficult to use the target to develop the dialogue that should have been 
possible”.41 We share these concerns. It is clearly not sensible to have targets set in such an 
arbitrary way. 
Failure to focus on delivering results 
47. Do targets actually deliver results? We found that the Government was achieving the 
majority of the PSA targets it had set itself, and that it had fulfilled its requirements to 
report performance against them (see below, paras 68–73) .Yet we discovered that targets 
and results were different things. The Government hopes that target setting will encourage 
service providers to apply creativity in making their activities contribute effectively to 
delivery. But in some cases creativity is being directed more to ensuring that the figures are 
right than to improving services. This is where measurement ceases to be a means to an 
end and becomes an end in itself. 
48. The danger with a measurement culture is that excessive attention is given to what can 
be easily measured, at the expense of what is difficult or impossible to measure 
quantitatively even though this may be fundamental to the service provided (for example, 
patient care, community policing, or the time devoted by a teacher to a child’s needs). 
There is the further danger that the demands of measurement may be so consuming of 
time and effort that they detract from the pursuit of a service’s underlying purpose. 
49. The measurement culture is also in danger of threatening standards. We heard of a 
number of cases where delivering on targets seemed to have become more important than 
delivering on services. Alarmingly, we received evidence that targets for ambulance 
response were jeopardising the effective delivery of services, and clinical outcomes. The 
national targets for ambulances require them to respond to life threatening emergencies 
within a certain number of minutes. We took impressive evidence from the Chief 
Executive of the Staffordshire Ambulance Service, Roger Thayne, who had a serious 
divergence of view with the Department of Health about the most appropriate measure of 
ambulance effectiveness. He argued strongly that the national response time target was 
inadequate: 
“The NHS Ambulance Service generally accepts that: 
a) There is no uniform standard of measurement of ambulance response times within 
Ambulance Services and that the clock starts at different times which may vary by as 
much as 3 minutes. 
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b) The classification of what is a life threatening emergency differs between Ambulance 
Services and ranges from less than 10% of all emergency calls to above 50%”.42  
50. Mr Thayne’s view was that the differences between the starting points, and the varying 
definitions of a ‘life threatening emergency’, cast doubt on the usefulness of the target. He 
then went on to suggest that one management response to the target could undermine 
professionalism: 
“The measurement of response allows the clock to stop when either an ambulance or 
qualified ‘responder’ arrives on scene. All ambulance services have therefore 
developed single paramedic fast response capabilities and many have also introduced 
lay first responders to help achieve response times. It is questionable whether the lay 
responders are either trained or equipped to meet the range of emergency conditions 
to which they are responded”.43  
51. It is clear that ‘lay responders’ are seen by some as the product more of pressure to meet 
targets than of real professional judgement. Mr Thayne’s service meets the national target, 
but also has its own, which is based on a variety of indicators, including cardiac arrest 
survival and general morbidity statistics. He told us that the outcomes were excellent, and 
that he felt that national targets were not appropriate on their own. 
Perverse consequences 
52. In another part of the healthcare system, we had evidence of problems with the 
consequences of targets for ophthalmology in Bristol. Dr Richard Harrad, Clinical Director 
of the Bristol Eye Hospital, told us:  
“The waiting time targets for new outpatient appointments at the Bristol Eye 
Hospital have been achieved at the expense of cancellation and delay of follow-up 
appointments. At present we cancel over 1,000 appointments per month. Some 
patients have waited 20 months longer than the planned date for their appointment. 
We have kept clinical incident forms for all patients, mostly those with glaucoma or 
diabetes, who have lost vision as a result of delayed follow-up; there have been 25 in 
the past 2 years. This figure undoubtedly underestimates the true incidence and of 
course there is the large backlog of patients still to be seen. One particularly sad case 
was that of an elderly lady who was completely deaf and relied upon signing and lip-
reading for communication. She lives with her disabled husband who like her is 
completely deaf. Her follow-up appointment for glaucoma was delayed several times 
and during this time her glaucoma deteriorated and she became totally blind”.44  
53. This is just one example of a wider problem. Dr Ian Bogle of the BMA had similar 
evidence: 
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“In my own area where I have worked for many years the ophthalmic unit cancelled 
19,500 follow-up appointments in a six-month period so that new patients could be 
seen to reach the target for new patients being seen”.45  
When targets put target setting before clinical need, they are clearly inverting priorities 
rather than advancing them.  
Problems with cross-cutting targets  
54. The Government stresses the benefits of targets as ways of making different services 
pull together to deliver results for the public. However, we found that in some cases the 
attempt to use cross-boundary and trans-departmental targets as a means of fostering a 
more ‘joined-up’ approach to service delivery was failing. This was largely because either 
targets for individual departments needed to be balanced with priorities in other 
departments or, more simply, that they were incompatible. Mr Narey (prisons) and Mr 
Neyroud (police) agreed with the Chairman’s observation that, the more the police met 
their target of closing the justice gap—putting people in prison—the more difficult it 
became for the prison service to meet its own targets on overcrowding and re-offending.46  
55. It becomes difficult to prioritise in cases where targets are shared by more than one 
department or agency, or where the department is reliant on others to contribute toward 
meeting the targets. In her evidence to us Dr Morgan of the NHS Confederation saw a 
problem “at the top, at government level” firstly in getting agreement on what those joint 
targets should be,  and then in making sure that every department regarded these as a top 
priority.47  
Cheating 
56. The cases mentioned above demonstrate a failure by Government departments to 
understand the way things work on the ground, and to set targets competently. Beyond 
that, we also heard accusations of a more direct threat to the public service ethos: the 
deliberate falsification of information and failure to follow proper procedures, amounting 
at times to cheating. 
57. The recent case of a primary head teacher who, anxious to avoid a low league table 
placing, helped his pupils to cheat on Sats tests may be rare.48 Both the NUT and the 
National Association of Head Teachers believed this to be so. However David Hart of the 
NAHT thought that such cases might be on the increase.49 
58. In the NHS, some accident and emergency units appear to be prone to creative 
accounting. In their evidence to us the BMA, the RCN and the Patients Association all 
cited examples where targets for A and E maximum waiting times were being 
circumvented by imaginative fixes where trolleys either had their wheels removed or were 
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re-designated as ‘beds on wheels’ and corridors and treatment rooms are re-designated as 
‘pre-admission units’.50 
59. The Consumers’ Association told us of a range of near-corrupt practices in ambulance 
services:  
“Some ambulance trusts were massaging their response times in order to meet 
Government response-time targets. For example, in some cases ambulance trusts 
reported reaching patients in the near impossible time of less than one minute (and 
in one case less than zero seconds). Paramedics also told us that calls may be re-
classified once the ambulance has arrived on the scene, so a late Category A call may 
be reclassified as Category B in order to meet that particular performance target. 
More worryingly, Health Which? found direct evidence of pressure being exerted on 
paramedics to achieve the response time targets by altering records”.51 
60. Occasionally, deliberate manipulation of figures has come to light in other parts of the 
NHS. In 2001, the NAO reported on the inappropriate adjustment of waiting lists by nine 
NHS Trusts.52 The adjustments reduced the apparent numbers of patients on waiting 
lists—then a key target for the Department of Health—affecting thousands of patients’ 
records, and resulted in delayed treatment for some. 
Failures in reporting and monitoring  
61. In its evidence to us the NAO tactfully described the Government’s reporting against 
targets as still “developing”, noting the absence of either centrally accepted standards for 
reporting performance or of any general requirement for audit or validation of results 
reported. Many of the NAO’s value for money reports have examined departments’ 
performance measurement systems or validated performance data. The NAO reported that 
in over 80% of such ‘first time’ validations, they found that the organisation had materially 
misstated their achievements or had failed to disclose potentially material weaknesses with 
their data. In over 70% of validations, there were material inaccuracies in performance data 
used to track progress against one or more key targets. Taking a different frame of analysis, 
there were problems with the reporting of around 20% of targets examined.53 
62. According to the NAO the reason for these problems was a lack of attention to, or 
expertise in, performance measurement and reporting techniques. But the absence of any 
routine external validation of the measures meant that there was no external discipline on 
trust reporting, and no routine independent review of the quality of information. Our 
research into departments’ performance showed up significant variations in how progress 
against targets was reported. Typically, departments have been much more forthcoming 
about targets they have met rather than those in which there has been ‘slippage’ in 
progress. There is little central guidance on how such reporting should be carried out. This 
situation jeopardises the credibility of the whole policy of government by measurement. 
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63. Difficulties in monitoring and reporting have also sometimes been the result of poorly 
thought-out targets. The Statistics Commission complained to us that in some policy areas: 
“Targets have been set without consideration of the practicalities of monitoring and 
what data already exist. Sometimes this simply results in the need to collect 
additional data, potentially diverting resources from other priorities, but setting 
targets without baseline information runs the risk that targets are set at levels which 
are unrealistic (or undemanding) or which may be difficult to monitor effectively”.54 
64. The Commission pointed us to some difficulties in monitoring particular government 
services and programmes, including the NHS Cancer Plan and the campaign against child 
poverty. On the latter, they explained that it could take a very long time to arrive at the 
accurate figures for broad ‘outcome’ measures (often much longer than it takes to arrive at 
figures about inputs or outputs).55 The Commission reiterated this general point in its 2003 
annual report, remarking that there were several areas in which national statistics were 
inadequate for monitoring of targets. It concluded: “In the absence of good baseline 
information, the inevitable arguments about whether such targets have actually been met 
are liable to undermine public confidence in government”.56  
65. A particular issue in terms of performance reporting is that of shared and cross-cutting 
targets. There are many instances of PSA targets that are the shared responsibility of more 
than one department. Most of these shared targets are contained in an individual 
department’s PSA, where the same target is replicated for each department sharing the 
target. Other targets of this sort can be found in cross-cutting public service agreements, 
where responsibility for the whole PSA is shared between two or more departments, such 
as the PSAs on the Sure Start programme and on the criminal justice system. Normally 
departments co-ordinate their reporting on shared targets, but there has been the 
occasional example where this has not occurred.57 It has sometimes been difficult to follow 
progress against cross-cutting PSA targets, where the relevant departments all share 
responsibility for the targets, but where in practice accountability for them might slip 
between the interdepartmental cracks (for example in the 1998 PSA targets on action 
against illegal drugs). 
66. Beyond individual departmental failings, there is the larger question of whether 
performance against targets needs to be independently validated. At the moment, all such 
assessments are based on departments’ own judgements of how well they have performed 
against their targets. We doubt whether it is enough for assessment by government 
departments (however good the guidelines from the centre) to be used as the single 
yardstick. The Sharman report on audit and accountability in the public sector 
recommended independent validation by the NAO.58 From April 2003, the NAO has 
started external validation of the data systems feeding into performance reporting, as 
recommended by Sharman. However, this falls well short of independent external 
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validation of the actual judgements about whether targets have been met or not. More 
needs to be done to ensure the credibility of the figures. 
67. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Select Committee raised this issue in its report 
on the ODPM’s 2002 departmental annual report, in which it expressed scepticism about 
the veracity of the department’s reporting on targets. The Committee suggested that the 
department had an interest in presenting its performance in the most favourable light, 
which had the effect of inhibiting open and comprehensible reporting. The Committee 
concluded:  
“We heard that the Department monitors its own progress against its targets. With 
PSA targets ODPM, like all government departments, both sets and marks its exam 
paper. This undermines the credibility of the Annual Report. The Annual Report 
should make clear whether reported progress against each target has been externally 
validated in any way. The National Audit Office will audit the systems used to 
validate targets from 2003–06; but validating systems is a long way from validating 
the targets themselves. Reported performance can only be credible if targets are 
externally monitored, by bodies reporting to Parliament and not other government 
departments. We recommend that the National Audit Office should undertake such 
monitoring”.59 
68. The continuing arguments about whether targets have been met illustrate how hard it 
is to use performance information without party political considerations getting in the way. 
It has become almost impossible to have sensible discussion about targets because of the 
way in which the whole issue has become a political (and media) football. Conflicting 
claims have emerged from the Government and from the Conservatives about the actual 
number of these targets that have been met. The set of PSA targets published as part of the 
1998 Comprehensive Spending Review is the first round of targets to complete its life span, 
covering the period from 1999 to 2002. As such, it is the only set of PSA targets for which 
definitive judgements can be made about whether the targets have been met or not. In an 
attempt to clarify the situation, we tracked progress against every performance target 
contained in the 1998 PSAs. The results of this exercise appear below in summary form, 
with fuller detail contained in the annex.  
69. Our research found that 221 of the 366 performance targets set out in the 1998 
Comprehensive Spending Review were judged as met, representing 60.4% of the total. In 
contrast, a comparatively small number of targets were not met: 36, or 9.8%. Relatively 
high percentages were recorded for the number of targets where no judgement could be 
made of whether they had been met or not, since there was either a lack of data on their 
achievement (14.2%) or there was simply no final reporting at all on their achievement 
(10.4%). However, these totals are skewed somewhat by the inclusion of results for the 
smaller departments (these smaller departments were set service delivery agreements 
(SDAs) rather than PSAs in subsequent Spending Reviews, to reflect better the 
contribution their targets made to the Government’s overall goals and priorities). 
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70. An assessment can also be made of how well the main departments performed against 
their targets. By taking out the results for the smaller departments and the cross-cutting 
PSAs, we come up with a total of 249 targets for the main departments. Of these targets, 
67.1% were met while 10.0% were not met. The results can be refined further by looking 
only at those targets where a definite outcome was recorded (i.e. the targets were met, not 
met or partially met). This leaves a total of 211 targets, of which the majority (79.1%) were 
recorded as met, with a further 9.0% partially met and 11.8% reported as not being met. 
This means that the main departments, as a group, met or partially met 88.1% of the targets 
for which they reported a definite outcome. 
71. The findings from our research bear out both the Government’s and the Conservatives’ 
figures. The reason for this is that, while there appears to be broad agreement on the raw 
figures of numbers of targets met, the interpretation and presentation of them are quite 
different. The Government maintains that 87% of the 1998 targets have been met.60 
However, those citing this statistic sometimes omit to mention that: (a) it only counts the 
main departments’ targets, not all of the targets outlined in 1998; (b) it includes targets 
partially met as well as those fully met; (c) it only includes targets with deadlines within the 
reporting period (1999–2002); and (d) only targets where performance information is 
available are included. Hence, the 86% figure for targets met is quite heavily qualified, 
something that is not always made clear.  
72. Similarly, the Conservatives’ claim that 38% of the 1998 targets had not been assessed 
as met needs to be put in its appropriate context. Our understanding is that included in this 
figure are targets which really belong in a separate category, such as those that have been 
judged ‘partly met’, ‘almost met’, ‘ongoing’ and those where there is ‘insufficient 
information to reach a conclusion’. The Conservatives are careful to phrase the 38% 
statistic as targets that are ‘not assessed as met’, rather than ‘assessed as not met’. However, 
this subtle distinction is likely to be missed by most observers—as is reflected in the news 
reports based on these figures that said 38% of targets ‘have not been met’61 or were 
‘missed’.62 Hence, the suggestion that the Government has failed to meet 38% of its targets 
is overinflated, since this figure includes targets which cannot properly be considered ‘not 
met’. All this suggests to us that there is a strong case for independent valuation of the 
figures.  
73. Independent verification by a credible external source would go some way towards 
dispelling the current confusion about the precise number of targets that have been 
achieved. Beyond this, however, the onus is on those presenting information about target 
achievement to make clear what their figures actually refer to, with appropriate 
qualifications upfront. As we suggest later, much of the confusion could be avoided if a 
definitive official account of the number of targets met across Government were to be 
produced, properly audited and validated by an independent body. 
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Confused accountability and the problems with league tables 
74. One major cause of confusion over accountability is the fact that the centre does not 
have a strong enough sense of the importance of geography. Although the Westminster 
system tries to centralise the responsibility for the performance of all public services, the 
delivery of those services is dispersed, and often devolved. Most major public services have 
never been delivered by Whitehall departments. Departments do not have their hands on 
the management of programmes: they supervise policies for which ministers answer to 
Parliament. A decade and more of structural reforms in public administration has 
increased the complexity of what is, in effect, multi-layered government. At the top is a 
layer of Whitehall departments; in the middle are a set of institutions, such as local 
authorities or health bodies, supervising the delivery of public services. At the bottom are 
individuals who meet the public when they go to a school, a doctor’s surgery or a public 
library. This complex geography has a profound effect on accountability and motivation. 
75. There are therefore fundamental problems with the accountability of any target that is 
set centrally without proper reference to those on the front line. As long as targets are being 
met, the centre and local providers can happily claim ownership and credit. However, if a 
target is missed, this may well lead to acrimonious dispute about where blame rests. If 
impossible targets are set, then disowning responsibility for pre-ordained failure will be the 
first priority of the front line body which has been assigned such a hopeless task. It is a 
recipe for the growth of a blame culture. 
76. When government chooses extremely ambitious targets, there is the danger (whatever 
the intention) that any achievement short of 100% success is classified as failure. Simplistic 
approaches of this kind, with political and media charges about failures fully to meet 
targets, can be profoundly demoralising to school heads and classroom teachers, police 
officers and hospital staff who have worked hard to achieve progress in the face of local 
difficulties. Crude league tables and star ratings can be particularly misleading and 
demotivating. They tend to make everybody except the ‘league champions’ look and feel 
like a failure. They offer only a simple snapshot when the reality is much more complex. 
77. This leads to tensions, demoralisation and perceived injustices. John Bangs of the NUT 
described how he had witnessed the way that educationalists in Tower Hamlets, where he 
had taught for many years, were demoralised by their position in the league tables: 
“For English at Key Stage 2, the national percentage for getting young children at 
level one—that is when they are seven—to level four, at the end of Key Stage 2, when 
they are 11—level one is below the average at Key Stage 1—is 32%. In Tower 
Hamlets, with a Bangladeshi population of round about 65-70%, and also a big 
turnover, demographically shifting all the time, they managed to take level ones to 
level fours to 53%. It is over 20% higher than the national average. This is an 
enormous success, yet because Tower Hamlets failed to meet its nationally set target, 
it is considered to be a stuck authority… there are better measures than that for 
evaluating what is an enormous success for young people and for teachers”.63 
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78. The classic example of distorted accountability at ministerial level is the original 
numeracy and literacy targets in the Comprehensive Spending Review. Failure to meet this 
target contributed to the resignation of Rt Hon Estelle Morris as Education Secretary. Yet 
significant progress had been made, even if this fell somewhat short of the targets. The 
outcome of this ‘failed’ target actually represented a substantial improvement over the 
previous situation. Ms Morris told us: 
“I would not have felt the need to resign because the literacy and numeracy targets 
had not been met, it was the best thing I did while I was in office, it is the thing I am 
hugely proud of and the government has every right to be proud of. The difference 
was I said I would resign if the targets were not met and at that point it became 
different”.64  
79. This kind of example seems to us to be accountability gone mad, a case of process 
taking over from reality. At lower levels, we heard evidence of the ‘P45 targets’, success 
against which is  seen as crucial to the survival of hospital chief executives.  
80. We heard from several witnesses that school league tables had not reflected the rate of 
improvement of particular schools. The NUT also argued that even value-added tables 
were not the complete answer, failing to take into account other social factors such as 
migration patterns in the school-aged population. Nevertheless, there were signs that 
ministers had seriously considered using such flawed tables to decide on the fate of 
headteachers.65 Whatever the truth of the matter, this is not a message that inspires 
confidence that the lesson that crude targeting is counterproductive has yet been learned in 
all parts of government.  
81. Whereas none of our witnesses suggested that performance information should not be 
made publicly available, its relevance and interpretation were real concerns. Professor 
Brighouse saw a “dilemma of competing good”.66 Whereas improvement requires 
knowledge and awareness of where best practice can be found, simplistic interpretation, by 
the media among others, distorts this objective, emphasising a crude form of accountability 
rather than helping to improve services. 
82. Crude league tables do not necessarily help to identify and disseminate good practice, 
and are instead “often used in a primitive way”67 and “on balance are very often more 
harmful than they are productive”.68 The evidence we received from professionals 
supported this view, with the star ratings for hospitals suffering particular criticism for 
their failure to reflect clinical outcomes. The RCN suggested that far too much was riding 
on these ratings, including the opportunity of applying for foundation hospital status : 
“Hospital star ratings are a powerful tool as they are used to determine access to the 
performance fund, which amounted to £250 million in 2001–02 and £500 million in 
2003–04, and the extent of ‘earned autonomy’… As a consequence, the need to 
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achieve high star ratings has enormous potential to distort organisational systems 
and directly influence staff behaviour in ways which might not be conducive to 
patient care”.69  
83. Evidence from the private sector suggest that league tables, whether used internally or 
externally, need to be interpreted with care. Lord Browne said BP’s experience with league 
tables was “mixed”: 
“At one stage we did decide to rank order performance of very small units within one 
of our divisions, the retail division I think. This was interesting to start with. It said to 
people ‘I can see where we need to go’. Continuous attention on the league table, 
however, made the league table itself the purpose, not the learning. It is very 
important, I think, that league tables, or whatever measurement, should be used to 
improve and to learn rather than be the end in itself”.70  
84. Lord Browne told us that in the private sector it could sometimes be good to fail in 
relation to a target, if the failure contributed to organisational learning. The contrast with 
the treatment of targets in the political world could not be more stark. 
85. On the other hand, we heard evidence of the more sophisticated approach embodied in 
the Comprehensive Performance Assessments (CPA), which the Audit Commission has 
introduced into local government. Using a degree of self-assessment and striving to put the 
raw data in the broader context of performance, they seek to evaluate the capacity and 
skills of local authorities.  
86. There is also a need for greater clarity about what (and whom) the publication of 
performance data is for, and therefore the form that it should take. Is it to enable citizens to 
choose? Or to spur providers to do better? Or to offer reassurance about the spending of 
public money? Or to provide the basis for either the grant of greater freedoms or the 
imposition of greater controls? There can, of course, be more than one purpose, but in each 
case it is important to be clear what these are and, therefore, what is the most appropriate 
form of publication of performance information. 
The measurement culture adapts  
87. The case of the CPA is one example of the way that the measurement culture has, over 
the years, proved more adaptable than its harsher critics recognise. Governments have, 
since the beginning of the 1990s, recognised that setting targets and performance 
management call for skill, care and continuous learning from experience.71 This has led to a 
flow of guidance from central departments and others over the last decade, since targets 
began to be set for Executive Agencies, and also to statements of explicit policy changes 
over time in the PSA White Papers and elsewhere.  
88. Since PSAs were introduced in 1998 many changes have been made and our evidence 
suggests that the Government is preparing to make more. As we saw above, the number of 
 
69 PST 40 
70 Q 328 
71 see HC 482–I Session 2002–03 and HC 563–I 2002–03 
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targets has been sharply reduced, from 366 in 1998 to 123 in 2002.72 These crude figures 
may exaggerate the reduction, but the number of targets has roughly halved to an average 
of about 6 or 7 per department. 
89. Even at its most vigorous and assertive, in the first three years of the present 
administration, the measurement culture was moderated by common sense and the 
principles of the performance culture. Rt Hon Estelle Morris MP crystallised the point 
when she reminded us that “…literacy and numeracy was essentially a professional 
development strategy. You have talked about targets but where the money was spent and 
where the time was spent was in retraining every single primary school teacher in best 
practice English and maths”.73  
90. Thus targets and league tables have to be seen in context as one of a wider range of 
measures for improving public services. More targets are now outcome (or output) related. 
Floor targets were introduced in 2000. Some key targets have been changed (for example 
the switch between waiting list numbers to waiting times in health) or abandoned as 
unhelpful or unrealistic (examples are drugs and traffic congestion). It is recognised that if 
targets are stretching, some of them are likely to be missed, but that good progress can still 
be made. Targets have become less rigid, and more ‘aspirational’ (although there appears to 
be little understanding of the impact of that change in approach). 
91. There is also a greater emphasis from the centre on consultation The 2002 Pre-Budget 
Report said “all departments should consult delivery bodies at the target formulation 
stage”.74 It is acknowledged within government that more needs to be done. There has been 
progress in the relations between central and local government through the introduction of 
Local PSAs with targets which reflect a mixture of central and local priorities, though the 
numerical targets are set by central government, and are backed up by grants to help 
achieve the targets and by extra freedoms or flexibilities. The Government has also tried to 
improve the quality of performance monitoring and management. Official guidance on 
performance information in government appeared in a 2001 publication called Choosing 
the Right FABRIC: A Framework for Performance Information, jointly published by the 
Treasury and Cabinet Office among others.75  
92. This developing tentative acceptance of shortcomings by the centre is now being 
matched by an acceptance among professionals that government by measurement is here 
to stay. The RCN acknowledged that targets had some value: “It is unlikely that the 
Government will abandon performance management and there is a case that targets have 
been central to delivering some significant improvements in the NHS. Consequently, the 
RCN believes that performance management systems should be improved rather than 
abandoned”.76  
93. Ministers have also made some specific changes in policy and tone. In the recent DfES 
White Paper on Excellence and Enjoyment, a strategy for primary schools, there are signs 
 
72 Comprehensive Spending Reviews 1998 and 2002 
73 Q 956 
74 ‘Steering a steady course: Delivering stability, enterprise and fairness in an uncertain world’ HMT November 2002 
75 see HMT press release 37/01 
76 PST 40 
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of a very different approach to targets. The paper proposes several striking changes in the 
regime for primary school targets. Among other things, it accepts headteachers’ arguments 
that at present schools sometimes end up with targets which fit LEA or national targets but 
which schools do not own, and crucially says that in future schools will set their own 
targets with LEA targets being set afterwards.77  
94. The problem is that, for all the attempts to correct the excesses of the measurement 
culture, the overwhelming impression from our witnesses was still negative. While the 
Education Secretary promotes the idea that national targets for literacy and numeracy 
should be treated as less of a mantra, he is accused of wanting to use the new ‘value-added’ 
tables to single out headteachers for the sack.78  
95. In the next Chapter, we explore some proposals for achieving a more sensible and 
intelligent balance. 
 
77 ‘Excellence and Enjoyment: A Strategy for Primary Schools’ DfES May 2003 
78 TES Op.cit. 
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Chapter 3: Bringing the two cultures 
together 
The new localism 
96. We have heard much recently about the ‘new localism’. The Government set out its 
thoughts on a more ‘hands-off’ attitude to public services in a document published with the 
Budget in April 2003. It called its policy towards local providers ‘constrained discretion’, 
explaining it in this way:  
“Greater discretion provides local service providers with more opportunities to 
innovate, design and develop services around the needs and priorities of their 
communities… it is likely that many public services will be more effectively governed 
by regional or local bodies with better knowledge about providers’ performance and 
the needs of the communities they serve”.79  
97. We see the new localism as an opportunity for change. It could be a way of beginning 
to integrate the two strands of public service reform—the measurement culture and the 
performance culture.  
98. We considered whether, in the light of the evidence of professional demoralisation, 
perverse consequences, unfair pressure and alleged cheating, the culture of measurement 
should be swept away. Should there be a cull of targets and tables to allow the front line to 
work unhindered by central direction? 
99. This is a superficially attractive prospect, but an unrealistic and undesirable one. The 
increases in accountability and transparency brought about by the last twenty years of 
performance measurement have been valuable. Information is now available that cannot 
and must not be suppressed. Open government demands that people have the right to 
know how well their services are being delivered, and professionals and managers need to 
be held to account. The aim must be to build on these developments, while reducing any 
negative effects.  
Our approach 
100. The recommendations in this Chapter  are founded on the view that many of the ills 
of the targets regime can be alleviated by better integrating the measurement and the 
performance culture. One key to this is stronger leadership at all levels of the public 
services. In practice this means: 
• a willingness by ministers to choose and communicate clear priorities for public 
services rather than relying on a plethora of targets; and 
• a willingness by local service providers to understand the need for measurement and 
monitoring while also innovating and improving. 
 
79 ‘Public Services: meeting the productivity challenge’ HM Treasury April 2003 
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101. This would mean a courageous decision by ministers to accept that targets will 
sometimes be missed and that local service providers should set most of their own targets. 
If setting too many targets leads to ministers micromanaging, there is a danger that they 
will ignore many of the most important lessons to be learned from good management in 
both the public and the private sectors. If public services are to improve substantially and 
sustainably, ministers will have to let the new localism work; at the moment they seem 
reluctant to do so. Equally, service providers will have to acquire new skills so that 
ministers—and the public—can safely trust them with new freedoms. The reforms we 
recommend below are intended to support this new approach. 
102. Although there is much talk about the new localism, there is little detail about what it 
will mean in practice. The Government needs to end the uncertainty. It should, as soon as 
possible, set out detailed proposals for decentralisation of performance setting and 
measurement in the main public services, aimed at improving the process by increasing 
local involvement and reducing overlap in target setting. The Government should explain 
how front line staff and management, along with service users, will be consulted and how 
their views will be taken into account. Different arrangements might make sense for locally 
based services like schools, social services and police on the one hand and, on the other, 
unitary national organisations. 
103. Consultation could give those at the sharp end of service delivery, and local elected 
representatives and service users, the opportunity to draw attention to limitations in 
departmental assumptions about what is possible. Equally, it would give central 
government the opportunity to encourage service deliverers to suggest ways of measuring 
and improving their performance. The grey zone between what is possible and impossible 
is negotiable. Negotiation requires dialogue rather than imposed targets.  
104. Front line deliverers should therefore be given much more freedom to set their own 
targets. Appropriate monitoring is needed to ensure that basic standards are maintained, 
targets are sufficiently stretching and proper consultation has taken place. Consultation 
should be used to establish a consensus about what constitutes evidence of success in 
relation to a target. If service-deliverers are directly involved in the setting and 
measurement of targets, they can discuss with departments what types and amounts of 
change are realistic within a given time scale. They will therefore be fully committed to the 
targets, making it much harder for providers that subsequently perform badly to blame 
either the Government or the statistics that produce evidence of their shortcomings. 
105. The key objective is to develop and nourish a performance culture within public 
services. Targets, and measurement, are merely tools that, if used intelligently, can 
contribute to such a culture. If used unintelligently, they can conflict with this objective and 
make it harder to achieve. 
Options for local involvement 
106. This could be achieved in various ways. One option is the approach proposed recently 
by the Secretary of State for Education and Skills. Under this proposal primary schools 
would set their own targets but the case for ambitious improvements is clearly expressed. 
Mr Clarke gives LEAs the role of pressing schools to set challenging targets with year on 
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year improvement, making use of information about schools in similar circumstances and 
offering support for achieving targets. 
107. For locally based services arrangements broadly similar to those now proposed for 
primary schools would be one option, though within that the role of local authorities could 
be varied. A further variant might give a bigger role to local authorities which do best in the 
CPA. Another possibility might be a development of local PSAs in which the scale of 
improvement in the targets would be subject to negotiation between central and local 
government. 
108. National or unitary organisations such as the Prison Service could in principle be in a 
position to advise their Ministers what nature and level of average targets should be capable 
of being ‘owned’ by, and of motivating, their organisations. They could then decide targets 
for their component units which add up to the national figure. For this to work the sub-
targets would need to take account of the different starting position of different units—
unlike the present targets for units of the NHS which mostly require uniform performance  
to “be met within a given timescale by every NHS or social care organisation”.80 Again 
there would need to be an element of negotiation in the settlement of the national target. 
109. We see a role for the Audit Commission in much of this process, with the opportunity 
to build on the experience of the first year of the Comprehensive Performance 
Assessments. In particular, the Commission should develop the self-assessment that was an 
important and distinctive part of the CPA process. Central government agencies should be 
monitored in a similar way by the National Audit Office. Nor should central government 
departments themselves be immune from a CPA-type assessment, with associated public 
reporting (and ranking) of performance. 
110. One major signal that the Government is serious about the new localism would be a 
hard look at the number of targets and the way they affect those who deliver services. In 
general, the number of targets should be as small as possible. If everything is a target, then 
nothing is a target. Instead of key priorities being defined by targets, they are diffused by 
them. While progress has been made in cutting the high-level PSAs and making them 
focussed on outcomes, reports from service deliverers are unanimous in saying that there 
has been no decrease in the total number of targets which they are supposed to hit. For 
instance, while the Chief Executive of the NHS says that there are 62 targets in his service,81 
the RCN and the NHS Confederation both suggest that the number of targets on the health 
service front line is in the hundreds.82 The aggregate impact of targets from different 
sources which converge on particular organisations and individuals does not  appear to be 
monitored. Neither, it appears, is the opportunity cost of setting and monitoring targets. 
There needs to be much greater understanding of why the measurement culture is 
seemingly expanding while Ministers claim that targetry is being radically slimmed down. 
We believe that Ministers should increasingly concentrate on the key national priorities 
and allow, and indeed encourage, local units to set and monitor their own targets.  
 
80 NHS & Social Care Targets 2003–06 Department of Health 2003 
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111. Time is short if the new localism is to be made a reality in the next (2004) spending 
review, as it needs to be. Already the Treasury is preparing to send out to departments its 
guidance on target setting. By the spring of next year, new targets will have been set, in time 
for a likely announcement in July. Action should be taken as quickly as possible. 
112. We therefore recommend that the Government should produce a white paper with 
proposals for decentralisation of performance measurement in the main public 
services, aimed at improving the process by increasing local involvement in target-
setting. This white paper, which should be published in time to influence the 2004 
spending review, should also set out a strategy for reducing the number of all targets 
(especially precisely quantified targets) which have to be met by service deliverers. The 
paper should contain a series of options to enhance autonomy on target-setting by 
those directly involved in delivery of services, and detailed proposals for increasing 
consultation with them when key national targets are set. These key national targets 
should be few in number, and designed to secure basic national entitlements. The NAO 
and the Audit Commission should be involved as much as possible in the new system 
set out in the white paper.  
113. There is also far too little attention to the interests and views of users. The 
Government says a great deal about strengthening the focus on users, but there is very little 
serious attempt to involve them in the measurement culture. There are increasingly 
popular experiments at local level with citizens’ panels and other ways of bringing users in 
to discussion about services. The Government should consider (as part of its discussion of 
the new localism) how it can encourage the inclusion of measurement issues in these panel 
debates, with perhaps suggestions that locally-set targets should be put out for consultation 
before they are finalised. We were also interested in the Citizens First initiative in Canada, 
which the Committee discussed on its recent visit there, and which involves systematic 
monitoring of citizen satisfaction with the range of public services, along with a target to 
improve satisfaction ratings over a defined period. Some developments of this kind are 
already happening in this country, especially in the NHS. We would like to see a concerted 
national initiative. 
114. We recommend that the white paper should also contain a strategy for 
encouraging all providers to involve users more systematically in the setting of targets. 
This should include systematic monitoring of user satisfaction with public services.  
The need for grown-up government by measurement  
115. One of the major problems with the current targets regime is that, if the bulk of our 
evidence is to be believed, it does not appear to be particularly effective at motivating 
people. Few of our witnesses claimed that, in themselves, targets were inspirational, and, as 
we have seen, some saw them as obstacles to professional satisfaction and improved 
performance.  
116. As we argued earlier in this Chapter, however, the measurement culture cannot, and 
should not, be abolished. The accountability and transparency it brings are now an 
inherent part of our public administration. But the Government’s policy needs root and 
branch reform. It is time for the Government to promote a new set of measures that reflect 
reality and support sustained improvement, with the emphasis on useful and constructive 
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measures of performance. This should be the next stage of adaptation, a shift to measures 
that celebrate progress and identify failure more accurately and fairly. In this way, it could 
help to make a reality of the performance culture, balancing the need to challenge people at 
the sharp end of delivery while still making sure that they are involved and motivated. It is 
not an easy balance to strike, but the Government must try to do it.  
Asking the right questions 
117. This means, for instance, better and more intelligent comparisons. Effective 
benchmarking, for example, sees service providers being compared with other providers 
working in a similar environment or with similar groups of clients or users. For a hospital 
which specialises in treating heart conditions, it can be instructive to compare its 
performance with the performance of other heart hospitals, especially where there is a 
similar ‘case mix’ of severe or less severe problems. Equally, a school with a high 
proportion of free school meal pupils and/or a high proportion of children whose first 
language is not English could sensibly be compared with a group of others facing similar 
challenges. Equally, at the other end of the spectrum, a school in a prosperous and 
privileged suburb should be compared with others in well favoured areas to assess whether 
it is making the best of its comparative advantages. The effective manager can use such 
information to ask staff to explain what it is that might be making life difficult for them, 
and what can be done to put it right.  
118. Public services need to be seen as learning organisations, with learning aimed at 
improvement. This puts the apparatus of measurement, including targets and league tables, 
into its proper context. A target may be missed, but if learning takes place in the process 
then that is a gain. While this seems to be understood by the best private sector 
organisations, in the public sector a missed target is likely to be the object of political and 
media attack. This is both foolish and damaging, and prevents target-setting playing its 
proper role in helping public sector organisations learn how to improve. 
119. Asking the right questions is, indeed, the key point about the proper use of targets, 
and performance measurement generally. Whereas some have seen measurement as the 
answer to public service problems, good managers see it as a means of asking the right 
questions. Sir Michael Bichard told us: “Targets are just a way of measuring not a way of 
doing”.83 Effective benchmarking allows managers to ask themselves useful and realistic 
questions about performance. When targets are interrelated, for instance, they can be 
reviewed in ‘clusters’. The number of measures required should be as many or few as suit 
the problem at hand. For example, focusing on truants rather than truancy calls attention 
to the multiple policy objectives that arise in dealing with young people in difficulties at 
school. Likewise, focusing on people who have been hospital patients calls attention to 
what happens to people when they are queuing for admission and after they are discharged 
as well as the number of days or hours that they occupy a hospital bed. Monitoring a 
‘patient journey’ through the system can be more useful than a set of merely quantitative 
measures. Qualitative measurement of this kind is essential. Complex measures can 
therefore, in internal discussion, help to tackle complex issues. 
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120. A judgement then has to be made about how to report results to the general public. 
There is no doubt that those who both use and pay for services have a right to information 
about the performance of those services. But it is difficult to produce information in a form 
that is at once clear, comprehensive and fair. The so-called ‘spidergrams’, a very promising 
attempt to communicate the complex reality of police performance, were widely derided in 
the press, while the often misleading league tables seem as popular as ever. The 
Government should continue to strive to square this circle by improving both the quality 
of management information and the quality of accountability to the public, aiming for 
greater clarity and consistency about the purpose, audience and form of published 
information.  
Celebrating progress 
121. Much more recognition also needs to be given to progress made by those on the front 
line. Providing universal public services, with inherently limited resources, is a daunting 
challenge (and not helped by often crass comparisons with the private sector). Measures of 
progress focus on trends: they compare current performance with  past position. Thus, all 
service providers can make progress, whether their starting point is above average, average, 
or below average. Comparing a school’s performance over a number of years also takes 
into account differences in starting points. A school that is below average in performance 
because its catchment area includes a disproportionate number of poor families can still 
make progress from this unfavourable starting point, and a school with an intake of more 
favoured pupils is prodded to advance further rather than coast on its advantage. Focusing 
attention on the degree of progress immediately turns the spotlight on services that are 
going nowhere or going backward. After many years of measurement, much raw 
performance data is now available. It should be used to provide measures of progress that 
can give a more rounded and accurate picture of how our schools, hospitals and other 
public services are performing. This sort of benchmarking is already available to schools, 
(eg Performance and Assessment reports or PANDA) but it needs to be given a much 
higher profile in the presentation of information about performance for all services. 
What people want 
122. There is one especially powerful argument in support of the idea of moving to 
measures of progress as the touchstones of success. The first is that progress is what people 
want from their public services. Opinion polls about public services ask questions such as 
“Do you believe services are improving?”. People are not asked whether services are hitting 
their targets, and our perception is that few really care whether they hit them or not. In the 
end, targets are a technocrat’s tool, useful for monitoring but not important to the people 
who use services and vote in elections. The more targets can be related to progress, the 
more they can be meaningful. 
123. We are aware that the fascination with league tables and other crude measures will 
continue. The media, especially the local media, are unlikely to stop drawing up their 
rankings based on raw data. But the experience of OFSTED reports shows that rounded 
and thoughtful analysis has a place in the media. The success of the Government in moving 
the focus of comment on health statistics (at least partly) from waiting lists to waiting times 
shows that perceptions can be changed. We hope that the Government will make a 
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determined attempt to educate the media and inform the public about the real 
performance of public services. 
124. We recommend that there should be a shift in emphasis in Government policy 
from absolute targets to measures of progress in performance. In its white paper on 
targets, we urge the Government to include plans to promote trend measures showing 
clearly and graphically whether service providers are making progress, standing still or 
going in the wrong direction.  
Learning from experience 
125. For all the Government’s warm words about localism there remains a serious gap 
between the language used in Whitehall and the reality on the ground. Pressed by 
Ministers to make the machine work to deliver better services, civil servants are tempted to 
dictate to local providers (although the NHS has much more developed mechanisms for 
such control than local government or the police). Equally, front line staff can fail to make 
good use of targets and managers can treat them as boxes to be ticked rather than 
opportunities to understand their organisation better. Such skills deficits need to be 
addressed in the proposed white paper. 
126. We therefore recommend that an action plan on local performance measurement 
should be included in the white paper. This would set out how the Government intends 
to enhance the skills of local service providers in the setting and monitoring of 
appropriate measures. This should emphasise measures based on progress and long-
term trends rather than absolute targets. 
127. The action plan should also explain how the Government intends to ensure that 
departmental officials have an up-to-date understanding of service delivery, and front 
line experience (see also the Civil Service Reform Programme).84 
Improved monitoring and reporting 
128. Whatever improvements are made to the quality of targets and the degree to which 
local service providers ‘own’ them, there will continue to be a need for credible 
performance reporting. As we noted in Chapter Two, there are doubts about the soundness 
of the assessments made by departments. Action needs to be taken to ensure proper 
accountability for performance. 
129. We therefore recommend that the system for reporting progress against PSA 
targets be made more consistent and comprehensive, with detailed reporting 
requirements to be issued by the Treasury. The reporting guidance should set common 
reporting categories so that it is clear whether a target has been judged as met, not met, 
partly met, or if there is insufficient data to make an assessment. For current targets, 
the guidance might introduce different reporting categories such as those that the 
Scottish Executive uses: achieved, ongoing, on track, delayed and may not be achieved. 
 
84 In 1999 the then Cabinet Secretary, Sir Richard Wilson, submitted proposals for civil service reform to the Prime 
Minister. That submission described a series of actions upon which the Cabinet Secretary would report progress 
annually. 
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130. The guidance should also require the provision of adequate supporting evidence to 
back up assessments made about target achievement. There should be thorough 
monitoring of how adequately each individual department has discharged its reporting 
requirements before reports are released, to ensure that all departments provide 
relevant performance information for both improvement and accountability purposes. 
131. We noted above (paragraph 65) that, in reporting on shared targets, it is often difficult 
to determine the exact responsibilities of the relevant departments. This problem needs to 
be addressed. 
132. We recommend that the reporting on shared targets should make clear the 
contribution that each of the responsible departments has made towards achievement 
of the target. 
133. We also asked ourselves how independent validation of departmental reporting could 
be assured. In evidence to us, Nick Macpherson, of the Treasury, suggested that this task 
could be undertaken by select committees.85 We consider that there is a stronger argument 
for asking the NAO to carry out this function, given its expertise in the area of performance 
monitoring, and in order to build on its work in validating data systems. The resulting 
information could then be used by select committees in their monitoring of departments’ 
performance reporting. 
134. We endorse the conclusion of the ODPM Committee that the credibility of the system 
for monitoring targets is undermined by the lack of independent external validation of 
departments’ assessments about target achievement. 
135. We therefore recommend that the National Audit Office be given the 
responsibility for validating target assessments as a logical extension of its existing duty 
to validate the data systems for performance reporting. 
136. We also see great virtue in a revival, in a different guise, of the allegedly discredited 
Government annual report. This was discontinued some years ago amid a wave of media 
cynicism. The idea of increasing government accountability in this way is a sound one. It is 
an innovation that should have been built upon, not abandoned. The Government has 
pledged to make use of PSAs as a continuing instrument of accountability, saying in 1998 
that “The publication of PSAs represents a fundamental change in the accountability of 
government to Parliament and the public”.86 It went on to promise that: “The Government 
will report to Parliament and the public annually on progress and individual departments 
will publish further details in their departmental report”. It still needs to redeem that 
pledge. 
137. The Scottish Executive has published a consolidated performance report which sets 
out all of the Executive’s targets in one document. It contains a short progress report on 
each target, as well as summary totals of how many targets have been met, are on track, are 
delayed or which may not be achieved.87 For services controlled by Whitehall departments, 
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87 Scottish Executive, Recording Our Achievements, 2002 
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this quality of accountability to the public is not available. It is unsatisfactory that the 
citizen is forced to wade through twenty or thirty departmental reports to find out how 
services are doing. Our exercise has shown that it is possible for performance information 
on targets across Government to be brought together in one place. We have recommended 
a proper validation of performance information. The Government should therefore be able 
to produce an Annual Performance Report on achievement against all its targets along the 
lines of the Scottish Executive document on target achievement mentioned earlier, in the 
form of a revived and revamped Government annual report. This should be free of the spin 
that marred previous Government annual reports, and should be easy to put together from 
existing material. 
138. We recommend that the Government publish an Annual Performance Report on 
its overall performance that sets out how it has performed against each of its PSA 
targets, based on the existing performance reporting that departments are required to 
undertake. The information should be independently validated by the National Audit 
Office, the Audit Commission and the Office for National Statistics. 
Accountability 
139. In promoting the ‘new localism’ the Government is also inevitably opening up issues 
of local democratic accountability. Although many of our recommendations have focussed 
on the professionals who deliver services locally, they will also have important implications 
for local councillors. We hope that the Government’s white paper will provide much more 
encouragement for councils to become involved in their own target-setting. 
140. At the national level, some Parliamentary select committees have made good use of 
PSA targets in their scrutiny of departmental priorities and performance, though equally 
there are other committees that have barely considered their departments’ targets (if at all). 
Occasionally a select committee’s monitoring raises issues applying across the targets 
system as a whole, such as the ODPM Committee’s call for independent external validation 
of departmental reporting against targets.88 We consider that select committees should 
continue to build on the work of scrutinising PSA targets. Moreover, the scrutiny process 
might be assisted by the development and promulgation of guidelines for monitoring 
targets, which would improve the consistency and rigour with which committees examine 
targets. Such guidelines (which might cover matters like evaluating the quality of 
performance reporting and checking the validation of performance data and assessments) 
could be developed and issued by the recently established central Scrutiny Unit within the 
Committee Office of the House. 
141. More broadly, select committees and Parliament could be more engaged in the 
scrutiny of PSA targets at an earlier stage in their development. At present, PSA targets are 
formulated almost entirely within Government as part of the biennial Spending Review 
process.  
142. We recommend that, as part of a wider programme of consultation on target 
setting, targets in draft form should be referred to their relevant departmental select 
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committee for comment and proposed revision. The Government may also wish to 
consider devoting a debate specifically to the finalised PSA targets resulting from this 
process, as an adjunct to the debate that occurs on the biennial Spending Review. 
Changing the landscape  
143. There is a further issue. Centrally imposed targets are the expression of a centralised 
political system, in England at least, in which the weakness or absence of effective channels 
of accountability for services at other and more local levels means that all accountability 
has to run through the single channel of Westminster and Whitehall. This in turn 
reinforces centralising tendencies. If we are unhappy with this, as we believe we should be, 
then effective political responsibility for services has to be developed at other levels. It is 
right for key national standards to be set centrally, but there needs to be enough space for 
local initiative and innovation. This presents a considerable challenge, going beyond the 
immediate concerns of this report, but at some point it will have to be faced if central 
target-setting is really to be replaced by more local forms of political accountability. 
144. We also call for a more mature political and media debate about targets. If targets are 
understood as tools to improve performance rather than rigid ends in themselves, then 
judgement will be based on progress towards a target rather than failure and success. 
Targets are valued in the private sector for this reason. Government needs to be mature, 
not trumpeting when it reaches targets and not trying to hide the facts when it does not. 
Opposition should accept that, if targets are to be meaningful, they must be challenging 
and therefore not always met. This more mature political culture may, however, prove to 
be one target too many.  
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Conclusions and recommendations 
Decentralising targets 
1. We recommend that the Government should produce a white  paper with proposals 
for decentralisation of performance measurement in the main public services, aimed 
at improving the process by increasing local involvement in target setting. This white 
paper, which should be published in time to influence the 2004 spending review, 
should also set out a strategy for reducing the number of all targets (especially 
precisely quantified targets) which have to be met by service deliverers. The paper 
should contain a series of options to enhance autonomy on target-setting by those 
directly involved in delivery of services, and detailed proposals for increasing 
consultation with them when key national targets are set. These key national targets 
should be few in number, and designed to secure basic national entitlements. The 
NAO and the Audit Commission should be involved as much as possible in the new 
system set out in the white paper. (Paragraph 112) 
2. We recommend that the white paper should also contain a strategy for encouraging 
all providers to involve users more systematically in the setting of targets. This 
should include systematic monitoring of user satisfaction with public services.  
(Paragraph 114) 
3. We recommend that there should be a shift in emphasis in Government policy from 
absolute targets to measures of progress in performance. In its white paper on 
targets, we urge the Government to include plans to promote trend measures 
showing clearly and graphically whether service providers are making progress, 
standing still or going in the wrong direction.  (Paragraph 124) 
4. We recommend that an action plan on local performance measurement should be 
included in the white paper. This would set out how the Government intends to 
enhance the skills of local service providers in the setting and monitoring of 
appropriate measures. This should emphasise measures based on progress and long-
term trends rather than absolute targets.  (Paragraph 126) 
5. The action plan should also explain how the Government intends to ensure that 
departmental officials have an up-to-date understanding of service delivery, and 
front line experience (Paragraph 127) 
Better reporting 
6. We recommend that the system for reporting progress against PSA targets be made 
more consistent and comprehensive, with detailed reporting requirements to be 
issued by the Treasury. The reporting guidance should set common reporting 
categories so that it is clear whether a target has been judged as met, not met, partly 
met, or if there is insufficient data to make an assessment. For current targets, the 
guidance might introduce different reporting categories such as those that the 
Scottish Executive uses: achieved, ongoing, on track, delayed and may not be 
achieved (Paragraph 129) 
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7. The guidance should also require the provision of adequate supporting evidence to 
back up assessments made about target achievement. There should be thorough 
monitoring of how adequately each individual department has discharged its 
reporting requirements before reports are released, to ensure that all departments 
provide relevant performance information for both improvement and accountability 
purposes. (Paragraph 130) 
8. We recommend that the reporting on shared targets should make clear the 
contribution that each of the responsible departments has made towards 
achievement of the target. (Paragraph 132) 
9. We recommend that the National Audit Office be given the responsibility for 
validating target assessments as a logical extension of its existing duty to validate the 
data systems for performance reporting. (Paragraph 135) 
10. We recommend that the Government publish an Annual Performance Report on its 
overall performance that sets out how it has performed against each of its PSA 
targets, based on the existing performance reporting that departments are required 
to undertake. The information should be independently validated by the National 
Audit Office, the Audit Commission and the Office for National Statistics. 
(Paragraph 138) 
11. We recommend that, as part of a wider programme of consultation on target setting, 
targets in draft form should be referred to their relevant departmental select 
committee for comment and proposed revision. The Government may also wish to 
consider devoting a debate specifically to the finalised PSA targets resulting from this 
process, as an adjunct to the debate that occurs on the biennial Spending Review. 
(Paragraph 142) 
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Annex 
This annex sets out the results of research undertaken by the Committee to determine 
progress against each performance target contained in the 1998 public service agreements. 
Detailed results from this exercise appear in the main table below (table 1.1). It was 
compiled by examining each individual department’s reporting on achievement against its 
PSA targets, which can be found in departmental reports and autumn performance reports 
each year (and sometimes in smaller departments’ annual reports). Most departments 
reported the final out-turn against their 1998 targets in their 2002 departmental or autumn 
performance reports. However, the smaller departments stopped reporting on their 1998 
targets once these were superseded by their service delivery agreement (SDA) targets 
formulated as part of the 2000 Spending Review. As a consequence, some results were 
determined by looking at previous years’ reports. In some cases, where it was unclear 
whether targets were finally reported on or not, the relevant departments were contacted to 
check whether final reporting had occurred. 
The figures in the table, particularly the totals of targets met, not met and so on, should be 
read with a caveat. Due to the inconsistency of performance reporting among departments, 
and the absence of a mechanism for independently verifying departments’ reporting, the 
figures should be taken as indicative ones only. In effect, the results in the table are a best 
estimate of departments’ achievement against their targets, given the sometimes limited 
information provided in departments’ reports and the lack of independent external 
validation of performance information. 
The categories used to classify achievement against targets are as follows: 
• ‘Number of targets met’ and ‘Number of targets not met’ are self-explanatory.  
• ‘Number of targets partially met’ refers to targets which consisted of two or more sub-
targets, where at least one, but not all, sub-targets were met. 
• ‘Number of targets where there was a lack of data on achievement’ refers to situations 
where there was a lack of information on whether the target had been achieved or not; 
for instance, where a target had been set for achievement by 2002 but where the 2002 
data were not yet available due to time lags in data collection. This is also the category 
used for cases where departments did not indicate whether a target had been fully met 
or not, and no relevant supporting data had been provided to ascertain the target’s 
actual status. 
• ‘Number of targets where there was no final reporting on achievement’ refers to those 
instances where departments did not publish their final assessments on achievement 
against their targets. This was more common among the smaller departments than the 
main ones. 
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Table 1.1: Reported achievement against 1998 PSA performance targets, for all departments 
Department/ 
PSA 
Total 
number of 
PSA 
performance 
targets in 
1998 
Comprehen
sive 
Spending 
Review 
Number of 
targets met 
Number of 
targets not 
met 
Number of 
targets 
partially 
met 
Number of 
targets 
where 
there was a 
lack of data 
on 
achievement 
Number of 
targets 
where 
there was 
no final 
reporting 
on 
achievement 
Agriculture, 
Fisheries and 
Food 
12 6 
 
3 1 2 0 
Cabinet 
Office (1) 
 
13 11 2 0 0 0 
Central 
Office of 
Information 
3 3 0 0 0 0 
Charity 
Commission 
 
8 8 0 0 0 0 
Culture, 
Media and 
Sport 
21 20 0 1 0 0 
HM Customs 
and Excise 
7 4 2 1 0 0 
Defence (2) 
 
16 7 2 2 5 0 
Education 
and 
Employment 
(3) 
11 4 4 1 1 1 
Environment, 
Transport 
and the 
Regions 
41 35 2 1 3 0 
Export 
Credits 
Guarantee 
Department 
3 0 0 0 0 3 
Foreign and 
Commonwea
lth Office 
10 7 1 2 0 0 
Forestry 
Commission 
(4) 
7 2 2 0 3 0 
Government 
Actuary’s 
Department 
3 0 0 0 0 3 
Health 
 
14 8 3 1 2 0 
Home Office 
(5) 
 
30 21 1 1 7 0 
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Inland 
Revenue 
 
8 6 1 0 1 0 
International 
Development 
4 2 0 1 1 0 
Intervention 
Board 
(MAFF) 
4 1 0 0 0 3 
HM Land 
Registry (6) 
 
2 2 0 0 0 0 
Law Officers’ 
Departments 
13 9 1 0 3 0 
Lord 
Chancellor’s 
Department 
9 3 2 1 3 0 
National 
Savings 
 
6 5 1 0 0 0 
Northern 
Ireland Court 
Service (7) 
5 3 0 0 0 2 
Offices of 
Electricity 
Regulation 
and Gas 
Supply 
(OFFER and 
OFGAS) 
10 4 0 0 0 6 
Office of Fair 
Trading 
11 0 0 0 0 11 
Office for 
National 
Statistics 
3 2 0 0 1 0 
Office for 
Standards in 
Education 
(OFSTED) (8) 
6 5 1 0 0 0 
Office of 
Telecommuni
cations 
(OFTEL) 
9 3 2 0 1 3 
Office of 
Water 
Services 
(OFWAT) 
8 5 0 0 2 1 
Public Record 
Office (9) 
2 1 0 0 0 1 
Social 
Security 
 
17 10 0 2 5 0 
Trade and 
Industry 
 
12 4 2 4 2 0 
HM Treasury 
 
33 24 1 1 7 0 
Action 
against 
Illegal Drugs 
(10) 
4 0 0 0 0 4 
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Criminal 
Justice 
System (11) 
9 3 1 0 5 0 
Sure Start 
(12) 
 
12 4 5 0 3 0 
Interim totals 
 
386 232 39 20 57 38 
Less 
instances of 
shared PSA 
targets 
20 11 3 1 5 0 
Final totals 
 
366 221 36 19 52 38 
Percentages 
 
100% 60.4% 9.8% 5.2% 14.2% 10.4% 
Source: Compiled from 2000, 2001 and 2002 departmental and annual reports, and 2002 autumn performance 
reports 
Notes: 
(1) Responsibility for one target (on Government Estate surplus buildings) was transferred from the Cabinet 
Office to the Treasury during the reporting period. 
(2) Achievement against Ministry of Defence targets is reported in its annual performance report. 
(3) Responsibility for three targets (on employment) was transferred to the Department of Work and Pensions 
following the reorganisation of government Departments after the June 2001 general election. 
(4) Responsibility for one target (on Welsh forests) was transferred from the Forestry Commission to the Welsh 
Assembly during the reporting period. 
(5) Responsibility for three targets (on fire safety) was transferred from the Home Office to the Department for 
Transport, Local Government and the Regions during the reporting period. 
(6) HM Land Registry has three targets listed in its 1998 PSA, but only two are reported here as these were the 
performance targets (the other was an efficiency target). 
(7) Reported achievement against the Northern Ireland Court Service’s targets is recorded as at the end of 
September 2002. 
(8) Reported achievement against OFSTED’s targets relates to its revised PSA targets, as OFSTED updated its 
targets a year after they appeared in the 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review. 
(9) The Public Record Office has four targets listed in its 1998 PSA, but only two are reported here as these were 
the performance targets (the other two were efficiency targets). 
(10) Reporting on this area appeared in the Anti-Drugs Co-ordinator’s annual reports.  The targets in the 1998 
Action Against Illegal Drugs PSA were not finally reported on as they were superseded the following year by 
targets contained in the government’s anti-drugs strategy (and which were replicated in the 2000 Action Against 
Illegal Drugs PSA). 
(11) Achievement against these targets (which were replicated in the Criminal Justice System strategic plan 1999-
2002) is reported in the Criminal Justice System annual report. 
(12) Achievement against Sure Start targets is reported in the Department for Education and Skills’ departmental 
report. 
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Table 1.2: Summary of main Departments’ reported achievement against 1998 PSA performance 
targets 
Department Total 
number of 
PSA 
performance 
targets in 
1998 
Comprehen
sive 
Spending 
Review 
Number of 
targets 
met 
Number of 
targets not 
met 
Number of 
targets 
partially 
met 
Number of 
targets 
where 
there was 
a lack of 
data on 
achievement 
Number of 
targets 
where 
there was 
no final 
reporting 
on 
achievement 
Interim totals 
of main 
Departments’ 
reported 
achievement 
against PSA 
targets 
264 176 27 20 40 1 
Less 
instances of 
shared PSA 
targets 
15 9 2 1 3 0 
Final totals 
of main 
Departments’ 
reported 
achievement 
against PSA 
targets 
249 167 25 19 37 1 
Percentages 
 
100% 67.1% 10.0% 7.6% 14.9% 0.4% 
Source: Derived from Table 2.1 above 
Table 1.3: Summary of main Departments’ reported achievement against 1998 PSA performance 
targets, where final performance information was available 
Department Total number of 
PSA performance 
targets in 1998 
Comprehensive 
Spending Review 
Number of targets 
met 
Number of targets 
not met 
Number of targets 
partially met 
Totals of main 
Departments’ 
reported 
achievement 
against PSA 
targets, where 
final performance 
information was 
available 
211 167 25 19 
Percentages 100% 79.1% 11.8% 9.0% 
Source: Derived from Table 2.2 above 
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Formal minutes 
Thursday 10 July 2003 
Members present: 
Tony Wright, in the Chair 
Mr Kevin Brennan 
Annette Brooke 
Sir Sydney Chapman 
Mr David Heyes 
 Mr Kelvin Hopkins 
Mr Ian Liddell-Grainger 
Mr John Lyons 
Mr Gordon Prentice 
The Committee deliberated. 
Draft Report (On Target? Government By Appointment), proposed by the Chairman, 
brought up and read. 
Ordered, That the Chairman’s draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. 
Paragraphs 1 to 144 read and agreed to. 
Summary agreed to. 
An Annex—(The Chairman)—brought up, read and agreed to. 
Resolved, That the Report be the Fifth Report of the Committee to the House. 
Ordered, That the provisions of Standing Order No. 134 (Select Committee (Reports)) be 
applied to the Report. 
Ordered, That the Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee be 
reported to the House. 
[Adjourned till Thursday 11 September at 10.00am 
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